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Abstract
This article considers the current age and gender discrimi-
natory migration laws in Nepal in their historical and 
socio-cultural context. Drawing on eight months of field-
work and data collected from both migrants and migra-
tion policymakers I ask, What are the consequences of 
discriminatory laws on young Nepali women’s migration 
experiences? And why do gender and age discriminatory 
laws and policies persist in light of evidence that they may 
actually endanger migrants? I posit that historically domi-
nant Hindu gender norms provide the basis for the pater-
nalistic migration laws currently in place. I argue that age 
and gender discriminatory migration policies are rooted 
in patriarchal concern for women’s ijaat (social honour) 
and sexual purity. The result of discriminatory law is not 
a reduction in migration but an increase in irregular and 
illegal migration that exacerbates women labour migrants’ 
vulnerability to a variety of abuses. I conclude that exam-
ining discriminatory migration laws with an intersectional 
lens raises interesting possibilities for theorizing how and 
why these ineffectual laws persist.
Résumé
Cet article se penche sur la législation discriminatoire 
actuelle en matière de migration concernant l’âge et le 
sexe au Nepal et son contexte historique ainsi que socio-
culturel. En faisant appel aux données de sondage et de 
nature ethnographique provenant des migrants ainsi que 
des responsables en matière de politique migratoire, je 
considère en premier lieu: quelles sont les conséquences des 
lois discriminatoires sur les migrantes népalaises jeunes ? 
Et quelles sont les raisons pour lesquelles des lois discrimi-
natoires concernant l’âge et le sexe persistent encore à la 
lumière des indications démontrant que ces lois risquent 
en fait de mettre en danger les migrants ? J’estime que le 
sexe hindou dominant sur le plan historique fournit la 
base sur les lois paternalistes actuelles, et que les lois dis-
criminatoires concernant l’âge et le sexe sont ancrées dans 
un ordre patriarcal du ijaat (l’honneur social) et de pureté 
sexuelle chez les femmes. Le résultat est l’augmentation 
de la migration illégale et irrégulière, ce qui amplifie la 
vulnérabilité ainsi que divers abus de femmes migrantes. 
Je conclus sur une discussion portant sur la manière dont 
une politique plus adaptée pourrait répondre à la légis-
lation migratoire actuelle qui ne prend pas en compte la 
complexité du processus décisionnaire. 
Introduction
In response to limited economic opportunities in Nepal, migrating abroad for labour has become a common live-lihood strategy. In 2014, remittances sent from Nepalis 
working overseas accounted for over a quarter of Nepal’s 
GDP.2 While the majority of overseas workers are men, the 
number of Nepali women migrating abroad has steadily 
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increased. In an attempt to “protect” Nepali women from 
exploitation abroad, the state has implemented gender dis-
criminatory migration laws, which restrict women under 
thirty from leaving the country to work as domestic labour-
ers in Gulf countries.3 Instead of curbing migration, these 
laws have pushed women’s migration, both to the Gulf and 
other destinations, into more precarious and dangerous 
migration channels. 
This article considers the current age and gender dis-
criminatory migration laws in Nepal in their historical and 
socio-cultural context. Drawing on eight months of field-
work and data collected from both migrants and migration 
policymakers, I attempt to answer three questions:
1. What are the socio-cultural and political antecedents 
that contextualize contemporary gender and age dis-
criminatory migration laws in Nepal?
2. What are the consequences of discriminatory laws on 
young Nepali women’s migration experiences?
3. Why do gender and age discriminatory laws and poli-
cies persist in light of evidence that they may actually 
endanger migrants?
Background
Nepal has a population of about 30 million and was, until 
2008, ruled as a Hindu kingdom. In 2008, at the end of over 
a decade (1996–2006) of civil war between Maoist guerril-
las and the monarchy, Maoists were swept into power and 
in short order declared Nepal a secular, democratic republic. 
Although Nepal is a comparatively small country next to its 
large neighbours India and China, it is exceptionally diverse. 
The populace is stratified along lines of caste, class, ethnicity, 
religion, mother tongue, and extreme geographic difference. 
Historically, high-caste Hindus living in the central mid-
hills of Nepal have exerted political, economic, and social 
dominance over low-caste and ethnic minority populations. 
The dominance of high-caste hill Hindus (HCHH) lingers to 
this day and is evident in the ongoing civil unrest that has 
intermittently punctuated the political landscape from 2006 
onwards. Exacerbating Nepal’s troubled polity is the socio-
economic condition of many Nepalis. Nepal is considered 
a least-developed country, and a majority of its population 
practise subsistence agriculture as their primary livelihood.4
Out-migration has a long and storied history in Nepal, 
most prominently in the form of young Nepali men leaving to 
work in foreign armies as Gurkha soldiers.5 In the last thirty 
years, a chronically depressed economy and a decade of con-
flict have precipitated a mass exodus of working-age Nepalis 
from the rural hinterlands into cities and abroad.6 Walking 
in any major city in Nepal, one is confronted with countless 
signs advertising opportunities to work or study abroad.7 The 
overwhelming message on billboard after billboard is that 
economic opportunities lie outside of Nepal.8 There is a deep 
and abiding feeling amongst young Nepalis that working 
abroad is the only way to earn a decent salary and support 
their families.9 Going abroad and remitting has become a 
normative livelihood strategy and is evidenced in the pro-
found dependence of many families on remitted wages. In 
2014, remittances from workers overseas accounted for 29 per 
cent of the GDP.10 This astounding figure makes Nepal second 
in the world for remittances as percentage of GDP.
According to a 2011 World Bank census, approximately 
2.1 million Nepalis (over 7 per cent of the population) are 
working overseas.11 Reading the many government and NGO 
reports on migration, an interesting pattern emerges; there 
are few data on women migrants. The common refrain is 
that the data that do exist are unquestionably inaccurate.12 
According to Nepal’s Department of Foreign Employment 
(DoFE), less than 4 per cent of labour permits between 2006 
and 2013 were issued to women.13 In 2013/2014 the DoFE 
granted 29,152 permits to women.14 Yet the DoFE and every 
other organization working on migration estimates that the 
actual number of women departing each year is considera-
bly higher.15 The discrepancy comes from the fact that many 
women migrate illegally. Women who do migrate legally 
tend to be more affluent, work in higher-tier jobs such as 
nursing, and migrate to more “desirable” destinations like 
the United Kingdom and Australia.16 In short, women with 
the financial resources and educational background to eas-
ily navigate official migration channels use them. However, 
women who migrate illegally are generally from lower 
socio-economic backgrounds and are less likely to have the 
literacy, money, and social capital necessary to facilitate 
formal emigration. Women who migrate illegally often per-
form domestic labour such as child care or elder care, food 
service work, or janitorial services while abroad. 
Poor Nepalis are especially likely to migrate to the Mid-
dle East. In Nepal, law states that women under thirty can-
not migrate to the Gulf countries (Dubai, Bahrain, Oman, 
Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), which are the primary 
destinations for poor Nepali migrants, both male and 
female. These discriminatory laws were ostensibly passed 
to protect women, as the DoFE states explicitly: “The intent 
[of the ban] is to protect women from many risks, includ-
ing long working hours, sexual violence, physical abuse and 
economic exploitation.”17 
The logic of the ban is that simply forbidding women to 
go abroad will stop them, thus protecting them from dan-
gerous work conditions. Instead, the law has put women at 
greater risk. Women in economic need continue to migrate, 
only now they must do so through informal channels that 
have few safety nets and little recourse, should the situa-
tion prove exploitative or dangerous.18 There is mounting 
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evidence that age and gender discriminatory laws are inef-
fectual and counterproductive.19 Yet they remain. Why? 
Male labour migrants face manifold challenges abroad. 
Images of coffins returning from Gulf states bearing the 
bodies of young men are frequently plastered across Nepali 
newspapers. Despite the clear empirical evidence of danger-
ous working conditions, the state has yet to pass laws “pro-
tecting” male migrants. This failure to pass laws addressing 
the dangers faced by Nepali men working abroad suggests 
that bans on women’s labour migration to the Gulf and other 
states is not just about their protection. In the following sec-
tions I explore the socio-cultural underpinnings of gender 
discriminatory laws and suggest that historically dominant 
gender ideologies keep these laws in place, despite clear evi-
dence of their failure to protect women.
Methods
This article is based on data collected through eight months 
of participant observation at an NGO founded by and pro-
viding programming for returned migrant women, as well 
as surveys administered to returned and departing women 
migrants. The variety of sources provides a triangulation 
of sorts, which cross-verifies—from the perspective of 
migrants, policy advocates, and policymakers—the chal-
lenges women migrants encounter.20 The mixed-methods 
approach employed here is particularly trenchant for a 
study of migration in Nepal, as previous treatments have 
tended to focus on modelling migration flows21 rather than 
the analysis of fine-grained ethnographic data.
The bulk of the data were collected during participant 
observation conducted at Gumnu Nepal,22 a well-established 
organization run by returned women migrants. The director 
of Gumnu allowed me to participate in and observe the daily 
functions of the organization in exchange for ad hoc office 
work. During biweekly visits to their main office I would 
speak with Gumnu staff about ongoing projects, shadow the 
director and assistant director in meetings, and perform ser-
vices for the organization such as translating Nepali content 
into English and grant writing. While working with Gumnu 
I had the opportunity to attend organization meetings, read 
policy papers not available to the public, and sit in on phone 
calls and in-person meetings between Gumnu staff and mid-
and high-level government bureaucrats. 
This article is also informed through additional par-
ticipant observation conducted while employed as a project 
manager on a U.S.-funded study concerning countering 
trafficking in persons (CTIP) programming. In both my 
voluntary role at Gumnu and my employed role for the 
CTIP project I did not set out to collect information linking 
gender discriminatory laws with the experiences of women 
migrants. Nevertheless a pattern emerged as I observed how 
the former profoundly shaped the latter. As an “insider” in 
my field sites but an “outsider” as a white academic from 
the Global North, the data I present are inevitably filtered 
through both my personal standpoint and the institutional 
lenses of my partner organizations. Nevertheless, partici-
pant observation, as a cornerstone of ethnographic method, 
is also widely acknowledged as a valuable tool, especially 
for capturing rich, qualitative, experience-based details. 
Throughout this article I use data collected during partici-
pant observation to add nuance and depth to my discussion 
of migration experiences and to underscore the real-life 
consequences of policy and law on Nepalis.23
Finally, I also draw on survey data collected from 
returned migrant women. In July 2015 I partnered with 
Gumnu to look at the effects of the 25 April earthquake on 
women’s migration decision-making. My primary research 
questions considered how returned and potential women 
migrants were (or were not) considering migrating in the 
face of short- and long-term economic instability. Partici-
pants were initially approached at Gumnu’s district offices, 
which provide services such as legal aid to departing and 
returning migrant women and their families. Subsequent 
participants were found using snowball sampling. 
I collected thirty-five surveys: fourteen from a highly 
affected region and twenty-one from a minimally affected 
region. From the minimally affected region the informants 
had a mean age of 30.17 years ranging from twenty-two to 
forty. All were married. Of this community, 14 per cent 
identified as high caste (Brahmin or Chettri), 43 per cent 
identified as low caste, and 43 per cent identified as an ethnic 
minority group. From the highly earthquake affected region 
the informants had a mean age of 30.07 years, ranging from 
20 to 42. All were married. From this community 14 per cent 
identified as high caste (Brahmin or Chettri), 14 per cent iden-
tified as low caste or another ethnic group, and the majority, 
72 per cent, identified as part of the historically marginalized 
Tamang ethnic group. In this study I focused particularly on 
women’s transit and labour experiences because literature on 
migration in Nepal is centred mostly on male migration.24 
Scholarship that does focus on women mostly considers 
women who are “left behind” by male migrants rather than 
women migrants themselves.25 Along with data on migration 
decision-making, the survey queried participant’s knowledge 
of relevant migration law and policy. Thus, the data I use to 
inform the arguments below are from eclectic sources; from 
both Nepali and foreign NGO workers, government employ-
ees, and poor migrant women themselves.
Hegemonic Hinduism and Honour Culture
There is no one “Nepali woman,” and attempts to understand 
“women’s status” in Nepal or the status of “women Nepali 
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migrants” can only be partial and necessarily shallow.26 Yet 
across the profound diversity of women’s lives27 there are 
similarities of experience. In particular, widespread patriar-
chal norms have circumscribed the privileges and opportuni-
ties afforded to women and girls in comparison to boys and 
men.28 This is reflected in the gaps in educational attainment, 
earning, and political involvement between men and women 
as well as gender discriminatory laws.29 
Women’s systematic marginalization can, in part, be 
traced to the founding of Nepal as a Hindu kingdom in 
1769. Successive kings codified Hindu doctrine into state 
law, which used Hindu cosmological understandings of 
hierarchical social order as the basis for determining social 
prestige as well as legal standing.30 Explicit caste- and gender- 
based discrimination was a structuring component of 
Nepal’s social and legal system until reforms in 1950 over-
turned some, but not all, discriminatory laws.31 Even with 
legal reforms and social revolutions, the social hegemony of 
high-caste gender norms persist in institutions and everyday 
interactions.32 In 2002, the eleventh amendment to the con-
stitution instituted a series of reforms to promote increasing 
gender equity. For example, women’s right to divorce and 
more gender-equitable inheritance rights were instituted.
 As the 2000s progressed, it seemed that progressive 
legislation would continue to erode gender discriminatory 
policy. The final dissolution of the Hindu monarchy in 2008 
followed by the drafting of a new constitution was expected 
to herald a new era of gender equality. In particular, nagging 
discriminatory policies such as those limiting women’s abil-
ity to pass citizenship to their offspring were to be abolished. 
And this did happen, at least on paper. In the 2006 Citizen-
ship Act and the 2007 Interim Constitution, a discourse of 
gender equality is prominently featured. However, at the 
passage of a new and controversial constitution, a turn back 
toward conservatism is apparent. Gains outlined in the 
interim constitution have been rolled back in the newest 
iteration of the constitution promulgated on 20 September 
2015. Most galling, Nepali women cannot pass Nepali citi-
zenship on to their children, effectively consigning women 
as a group to secondary status.33 The disappointment from 
women’s rights activists and progressive Nepali social and 
political groups is palpable, as it was hoped the new consti-
tution would cement rather than undo democratizing gains 
made during the transition from monarchy to republic.
While the historically male, high-caste Hindu government 
has promoted a message of Nepali prosperity through devel-
opment, access to the promises of development—including 
education,34 job opportunities, and political power35—have 
been unequally distributed.36 The majority of women have 
been excluded from the public and civil sphere of society for 
much of Nepal’s history as a state.37 Consequently, Nepali 
women face a tension between meeting normative gender 
expectations and participating in activities like work abroad.38 
Patriarchal ideas discouraging female mobility, education, or 
political involvement continue to hold widespread popular-
ity39 and are still recognized as influencing women’s behav-
iour40 and decision-making.41 These norms provide the basis 
for the paternalistic age and gender discriminatory migra-
tion laws currently in place.
Age and gender discriminatory migration laws are rooted 
in patriarchal concern for women’s ijaat (social honour). 
Within the context of historically dominant high-caste 
Hinduism, ijaat is a concept that is closely tied to a woman’s 
perceived sexual purity. According to high-caste Hindu 
norms, unmarried women are expected to be virginal, shy, 
and deferential to their parents. As married women they 
are expected to guard their reputation closely and transfer 
deference to their husband and in-laws. Further, women’s 
mobility should ideally be limited to the domestic sphere. 
In the domestic sphere, a woman’s honour can be assured 
through social surveillance by her parents and relatives and, 
after she marries, by her in-laws and relatives by marriage. 
Being seen outside the domestic sphere is grounds for social 
censure and an indication that perhaps a woman lacks ijaat. 
This is especially true for young women whose sexuality is 
considered dangerous to the woman and to those who come 
in contact with her.42 Norms of female domestic seclusion 
vary quite widely throughout Nepal, but there is ample evi-
dence that the ideals that underlie high-caste Hindu prac-
tices are recognized if not aspired to across caste,43 class,44 
ethnic,45 and religious difference. 
While norms limiting women’s mobility have been pub-
licly decried by Nepali social and political activists in the 
last several decades, and such norms hold much less cultural 
import than in previous generations, they cannot be called 
relics of the past. Indeed, many Nepalis still highly value 
female domestic seclusion to some degree, and such values 
are apparent in current gender and age discriminatory 
laws.46 As the continued struggles to implement women’s 
full constitutional and legal equality evidence, historically 
dominant Hindu norms that forward women’s subordinate 
status still hold considerable influence at the highest levels 
of policymaking. Age and gender discriminatory migration 
law and policy reflect a desire to constrain young women’s 
movements and protect them from their own dangerous 
sexuality and naïveté. The explicit argument is that women 
under thirty may fall victim to sexual exploitation, but the 
subtext is that young women may experience too much free-
dom on their own terms. 
Young women migrants transgress norms of female 
domestic seclusion on an international scale. Abroad, 
young women have no social surveillance and, in theory, 
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could participate in all manner of illicit activity. That this 
social fear undergirds current law is reiterated frequently by 
returned migrant women themselves. When I asked them, 
“In your opinion, is migration safe for women?” I was sur-
prised that few spoke specifically of economic exploitation or 
abuse—even though many had just told me of encountering 
such hardships themselves. Instead, a common refrain was, 
“It depends on you,” or “That is up to your own heart (man),” 
or most explicitly, “To be spoiled (bigrieko) or unspoiled, it’s 
up to you.” These statements connect safety directly with 
chastity and put the onus of maintaining chastity directly 
on the migrant woman. The language of spoiled (bigrieko) 
is an overt reference to women who engage in socially unac-
ceptable sexual behaviour. Thus, for the migrant women I 
spoke with, migration is safe if, and only if, it is done within 
hegemonic understandings of maintaining ijaat.
The Trope of Trafficking
Frequently splashed across the front pages of Nepali daily 
newspapers are stories of “traffickers arrested” or “women 
saved from trafficking.”47 While some women are trafficked 
into exploitative labour conditions against their will, there 
is also a growing consensus amongst migration organiza-
tions in Nepal that anti-trafficking operations often conflate 
trafficking, smuggling, and irregular migration and fail to 
listen to the women they are purportedly rescuing.48 In a 
conversation with the director of Gumnu, she noted that 
“rescued” women are quite often very aware of the risks 
they are taking and where they are going. A recent article 
in Nepal’s leading English newspaper covers the story of 
twenty-seven women returned to Nepal after being inter-
cepted in India on the way to work in the Gulf. The article 
describes the women as being “trafficked” and “lured” with 
offers of employment in the Gulf.49 The article makes no 
mention of the agency of these women, that they may have 
sought out such informal routes because of age and gender 
discriminatory laws, or that they are now almost certainly 
in debt with no foreseeable source of income. Instead, the 
article details their arrest, detainment, and return to Nepal 
along with their full name, age, and natal village. A focus 
on “rescue” and lurid details in Nepali media obscures the 
role of Nepal’s migration law in fomenting illegal migration 
channels.
The trope of trafficking plays into a narrative of naïve 
young women with a sexuality that is dangerous to them-
selves and those they come in contact with. Over the course 
of my work with Gumnu, several staff members expressed 
frustration with the disproportionate attention and funding 
directed towards “anti-trafficking” versus “safe migration.” 
Trafficking, they informed me, was fashionable, a buzzword 
that unlocked the gates to all-important international donor 
money. Sensationalized reports of innocent Nepali girls traf-
ficked to Bombay brothels and forced into sex slavery make 
great national and international headlines and is, in a word, 
“fundable.” Gumnu staff pointed to several very well-funded 
organizations in Nepal that have garnered international 
acclaim for their anti-trafficking work, but fail to include 
safe migration as part of their anti-trafficking approach. 
Instead, their tactics include border checkpoints where staff 
arbitrarily pull over young women whom they assess as pos-
sibly trafficked and subject them to invasive interviewing. 
These paternalistic tactics are in line with the discourse of 
naïveté and dangerous sexuality that underwrite the age 
and gender discriminatory migration laws.
Government policymakers use the trope of trafficking to 
justify continuation of age and gender discriminatory laws. 
The archetype of the trafficked Nepali girl offers the public a 
horrifying, and ultimately titillating image. Separated from 
her family and forced into prostitution with foreign men, 
it is the ultimate loss of ijaat for a young Nepali woman. 
Gender and age discriminatory laws have staying power 
because they are enmeshed in cultural narratives of gender 
and social honour. Such laws are held up as a way to protect 
young Nepali women from a future of ruin and dishonour. 
The trope of trafficking supports hegemonic gender ideol-
ogy, as it sits comfortably with norms that limit women’s 
mobility for their own protection.
The Problem of Papers
The laws governing out-migration for young women are 
complex and constantly changing. New memorandums of 
understanding, treaties, agreements, and temporary clo-
sures circulate frequently. For example, in 1999 the DoFE 
implemented the ban on women under thirty entering Gulf 
states, the ban was lifted in 2010, then reinstated in 2012. 
In the meantime, bans have been put in place and lifted for 
countries like Malaysia, Israel, and Lebanon. These bans 
sometimes apply to all women under a certain age or just 
women seeking visas for domestic work. Even experts in the 
field of women’s migration describe their frustration with 
knowing what the current laws are. For average Nepali citi-
zens, then, it is a truly daunting task. 
Even if a woman wants to migrate legally, navigating 
Nepal’s bureaucratic system to actually obtain a permit is 
notoriously difficult. A Gumnu legal-aid staff explained 
that a potential migrant would have to make approximately 
seven office visits before securing the right permissions. 
Stops included the Department of Foreign Employment for 
initial paperwork, the Ministry of Foreign Labour for fur-
ther forms, stops at specific country embassies or consulates 
for labour visas, and then an eventual return to the DoFE 
for final approval. This is assuming a potential migrant had 
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already secured a citizenship card, which requires its own 
lengthy procedure to obtain. 
On the other hand, a relatively simple process was 
described by survey informants who migrated illegally. A 
typical description involved using a dalal (private broker) 
or manpower agency. In exchange for a hefty fee, the dalal 
or agency arranges travel, documentation, and jobs abroad. 
Most frequently, after posing for passport pictures and 
paying their “placement” fee, the women were then given 
instructions to travel to a destination in India where they 
would be met at the train or bus station by a partnering 
agent. Nepalis can cross the open border with India fairly 
easily and without documentation. Upon reaching the 
rendezvous point in India, the migrants are furnished with 
documents allowing their travel overseas, including paper-
work and tickets to fly abroad.50 
Many young women migrants are poor, illiterate, and 
from marginalized caste and ethnic backgrounds. It makes 
sense that they prefer to migrate internationally using the 
services of a broker or manpower agent rather than work 
through official channels that would be both time con-
suming and likely involve working with male high-caste 
bureaucrats with a reputation for gender, caste, and class 
discrimination.51 Of the thirty-five women I spoke with, all 
twenty-eight of the returned migrants had used a broker or 
manpower agency and informal (illegal) channels. All seven 
informants who were planning to depart were unanimous 
in their decision to use a broker or manpower agency to 
facilitate their migration. 
Informal migration channels may be more practical 
and feasible for young women migrants, but the exorbitant 
placement fees that accompany such agreements frequently 
saddle migrants with intractable debt. Further, upon arrival, 
migrants often find that they have been given work totally 
different than their original contract and/or given less 
remuneration than promised. Yet, because their migration 
is illegal, there is little a migrant woman can do—especially 
because she is now burdened with debts that must be repaid. 
In these circumstances, young women regularly find them-
selves in abusive work environments with little recourse.
Illegal Migration as the Norm
The regularity of illegal migration was apparent in the survey 
results. As mentioned above, of the twenty-eight informants 
who were returned from working abroad, all had migrated 
to Gulf countries and all had migrated illegally. The Nepali 
state is well aware of the informal routes young women take 
to circumnavigate discriminatory migration laws. Relevant 
state actors are also aware of the dangers of informal migra-
tion. Even still, discriminatory laws remain. For institutions 
like the DoFE and Ministry of Foreign Employment, there 
is little reason to change the status quo. Keeping gender 
discriminatory laws on the books with the full knowledge 
that women will find ways around them is much easier and 
cheaper than designing and implementing meaningful 
migration reform. 
In his ethnography of bureaucracy in a Northern Indian 
municipality, Gupta describes the labyrinthine, impersonal, 
and literacy-dependent processes necessary to meet basic 
livelihood in his field site as structural violence.52 I argue that 
a similar dynamic is present in Nepal. By instituting laws 
that drive migrants into informal migration networks and 
by setting up migration procedures that make even legiti-
mate migration extraordinarily difficult, the Nepali state is 
pushing young women migrants directly into more danger-
ous migration pathways. Informal migration is by definition 
unregulated. In informal migration routes, young migrant 
women, who are also frequently poor, of low caste, and mini-
mally educated, are extremely vulnerable to exploitation on 
multiple levels. Their vulnerability may, for some, stem from 
genuine naïveté, but for many it is a chosen vulnerability, 
accepted with full knowledge and out of economic necessity. 
For example, six of the thirteen returned migrant women 
surveyed from an earthquake-affected district reported wage 
withholding and/or physical abuse of some kind during their 
work abroad. Such high rates of exploitation are consistent 
with what Gumnu staff encounter in their advocacy work. 
Given that women migrants tend to migrate to places where 
their family, friends, or community have migrated,53 it is rea-
sonable to assume that via their own social networks many 
young women migrants are quite aware of the potential risks 
and migrate in spite of them.
Policies limiting young women’s rights to unencumbered 
mobility not only expose women to additional violence 
throughout migration, but are in themselves a type of psy-
chic violence. In the paternalistic and disempowering spirit 
of the law, discriminatory migration policies tell young 
Nepali women that they are not to be trusted, that they are 
not capable of independent decision-making, that their pro-
tection by the state extends only insofar as they submit to a 
particular gender ideology. Tamang has labelled the pater-
nalism at the root of Nepali law and policy “state patriar-
chy.”54 Age and gender discriminatory laws are an extension 
of state patriarchy and indeed, the Hindu hegemony that 
continues to shape Nepal’s state-making processes.
“I will see for myself”
The immediate future does not bode well for young Nepali 
women migrants. The earthquake of 25 April 2015 and sub-
sequent political unrest has further rattled the economy and 
it is likely that out-migration will increase as jobs become 
scarcer.55 Further, migrating illegally to avoid bureaucratic 
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hurdles was common before the earthquake. In a post-
earthquake context, many young women from earthquake-
affected areas have little choice but to migrate illegally, given 
that official documents confirming age or citizenship may 
be buried in the rubble. Young women living on the open 
border with India also have little incentive to go through 
more congested government queues to access official migra-
tion documentation. 
Survey informants confirmed a general pessimism about 
future economic prospects in Nepal. Of thirty-five depart-
ing and returned migrant women, 74 per cent (twenty-six) 
believed that migration abroad would increase in the 
coming years. As one informant, twenty-three-year-old 
Sapana Tamang put it, “I have heard [migration abroad] is 
dangerous for some, but I will go and I will see for myself.” 
Sapana declared her intention to go while sitting in a small 
one-room apartment shared with her mother, sister, and 
husband. Her mother, who was seriously injured in the 
earthquake and who had herself worked illegally in Kuwait 
and been beaten and denied pay by her employer, looked 
on wistfully in agreement with her daughter’s plans. In the 
strain of economic necessity, young women like Sapana 
have little choice but to see for themselves. It is unlikely that 
young women will stop migrating through informal chan-
nels unless the Nepali state puts sustained and serious effort 
into reforming current migration policy and practice. This 
was improbable before the earthquake and seems even less 
sure as the government struggles to recover from a major 
humanitarian disaster.
Nevertheless, there is room for some optimism. First, 
women’s rights groups and feminist activists continue to 
press for meaningful change. Online petitions, press confer-
ences, demonstrations, and rallies at government buildings 
continue almost daily.56 Second, organizations like Gumnu 
continue to lobby for policy change. Finally, migrants are 
doing what they can to ensure their own and other migrants’ 
safety. For example, one informant, twenty-eight-year-old 
Kabita Lama, spent four years in Lebanon. During this time 
she recounts how she became heavily involved in a Nepali 
women’s group that sought out other young Nepali women 
migrants. In Lebanon, Kabita ran awareness-raising meet-
ings for migrants and assisted several women in abusive 
work environments with their escape and return to Nepal. 
Women like Kabita cannot and will not wait for the state 
to make better migration policy. Through their organizing 
and determined efforts, young Nepali women are working 
to ensure safer migration on their own terms. 
Discussion
Gender and age discriminatory policies in Nepal demon-
strate that identity in Nepal cannot be parsed into categories 
of “gender,” “age,” or “caste” for that matter. Instead, iden-
tity and how identity is interpreted by the state is intersec-
tional. Intersectionality, as a theoretical and methodological 
paradigm, underscores the interconnected and overlapping 
dimensions of social location—such as gender, age, class, 
caste, race, ability—that simultaneously shape individuals 
and communities’ lived experience.57 Discriminatory laws 
elucidate how young women migrants’ lives intersect mul-
tiple marginalized social categories, resulting in outcomes 
that cannot be parsed nor addressed without intersec-
tional analysis. For example, the ban on migration to Gulf 
countries extends only to women under thirty because the 
implicit assumption of the state is that women over thirty 
have most likely already married and given their virginity to 
their husband, thus fulfilling their primary honour expec-
tation. It is not that Nepal has gender or age discriminatory 
laws, it is that these laws are gender and age discriminatory.
In Nepal, it is young women who are the target of pater-
nalistic policy rather than all young migrants. It is young 
women whose dangerous sexuality must be contained 
through laws limiting their mobility. Further, it is often 
young women from lower-class and marginalized caste and 
ethnic backgrounds that are most effected by discrimina-
tory laws. As one Gumnu staff member informed me—and 
as my own limited sample demonstrates—most women who 
migrate illegally have limited literacy and, because of their 
social location, lack the cultural, educational, and monetary 
capital necessary to use legitimate migration channels. For 
example, thirty-four of thirty-five survey informants had 
completed less than a Grade 8 education, and twenty-five 
of thirty-five informants identified as members of a histori-
cally marginalized ethnicity or as low caste. Women like 
my informants face challenges as young women, as poor 
women, and as minority women that mutually constitute 
their vulnerability as foreign labour migrants. Gender dis-
criminatory migration laws exacerbate their vulnerabilities 
rather than ameliorate them.
Looking at discriminatory migration laws with an inter-
sectional lens raises interesting possibilities for theorizing 
how and why these laws persist. Within state policymak-
ing bodies that are still heavily influenced by high-caste 
Hindu gender ideologies, young women are a social cat-
egory requiring paternalistic oversight. I argue that age 
and gender discriminatory bans are a symptom of “state 
patriarchy,” not only in their overtly stated purpose of pro-
tecting women, but also in a much subtler and insidious way. 
First, these bans are in place despite undeniable evidence 
that they are grossly ineffectual and in fact push women 
into dangerous migration routes. Nepali women are then 
“saved” or “rescued” from “dangerous” situations by the 
same government they are circumventing. So-called rescue 
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operations provide ample justification for continued pater-
nalistic laws. Second, when stories of migrant women fac-
ing abuse and violence are circulated in popular media and 
through social networks, the state again lays claim to these 
narratives as further justification for more bans, rather than 
migration law reform. On an ideological level, both “rescue” 
missions and tales of abuse abroad bolster high-caste Hindu 
gender ideologies of female domestic seclusion. A perverse 
self-perpetuating dynamic results whereby the state sets the 
stage for unsafe migration conditions and then rushes the 
stage as the rescuing hero.
In this context, the risks taken by young women migrat-
ing illegally and any misfortunes that may befall them are 
framed as their own doing. In a sense, they had it coming. 
By transgressing laws that affirm the dominant gender ide-
ology, young women migrants butt up against more than 
bureaucratic obstacles, they push back against entrenched 
ideological power. The stated intent of gender discrimina-
tory laws is to protect women, yet the ideological intent 
seems to be aligned with upholding historically dominant 
gender ideology. If the dangers of informal migration and 
the violence women migrants face does not actually stand 
at odds with the ideological intent of discriminatory migra-
tion policy—and indeed furnishes policymakers with evi-
dence of the need for such laws—it may suggest why dis-
criminatory policies persist, despite their failure to ensure 
safer migration. 
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